The Effect of Government Deficits on Consumption and Interest Rates: A Two Equation Approach by Croushore, Dean D.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Economics Faculty Publications Economics
Spring 1989
The Effect of Government Deficits on
Consumption and Interest Rates: A Two Equation
Approach
Dean D. Croushore
University of Richmond, dcrousho@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/economics-faculty-
publications
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Economic Policy
Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, Public Administration Commons, and
the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Croushore, Dean D. "The Effect of Government Deficits on Consumption and Interest Rates: A Two Equation Approach." Quarterly
Journal of Business and Economics 28, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 85-129.
University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Business Administration
The Effect of Government Deficits on Consumption and Interest Rates: A Two Equation
Approach
Author(s): Dean D. Croushore
Source: Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring, 1989), pp. 85-129
Published by: University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Business Administration
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40472967 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 13:55
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
University of Nebraska-Lincoln College of Business Administration is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Effect of Government Deficits 
on Consumption and Interest Rates: 
A Two Equation Approach 
Dean D. Croushore* 
Pennsylvania State University 
Abstract 
Single-equation estimation of the consumption function often 
is used in testing the Ricardian equivalence theorem. This 
approach may be misleading, as effects on interest rates 
usually are ignored. This paper proposes simultaneous 
estimation of consumption and investment equations, with the 
interest rate serving to equilibrate the market. Five existing 
studies are replicated and subjected to sensitivity tests. The 
results show that the interest rate is important in the 
consumption function. The Ricardian equivalence theorem is 
tested, but the results are mixed. 
Introduction 
Over the last decade and a half, economists studying overnment 
deficits and interest rates have failed to establish a clear empirical 
relationship between the two variables. Previous studies have tested a 
variety of hypotheses using a number of different models, but almost 
all have ignored the interest rate as a variable affecting savings and 
consumption. This is surprising and disappointing from a theoretical 
point of view because the literature on the burden of the debt suggests 
that government deficits impose a burden on future generations 
primarily when they cause interest rates to rise.* Because interest rates 
are determined by market demand and supply, empirical testing requires 
a simultaneous-equations approach. 
In this paper, the misinterpretations that arise from single-equation 
estimation of consumption equations are demonstrated. Several results 
from the empirical literature are replicated and shown to lack 
robustness, uggesting specification errori Alternative hypotheses are 
nested, following the approach of Feldstein [13] and Kormendi [19]. 
New evidence is presented that shows that the use of simultaneous- 
equations techniques improves the specifications. The new results are 
not entirely robust, however, as they ignore some other important 
factors from macroeconomic theory. 
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Many of the empirical results on the effects of deficits are tests of 
the Ricardian equivalence theorem. Much of the testing began after 
Barro [1] revitalized interest in the theorem and began exploring the 
implications of debt neutrality for public policy. Table 1 shows the 
results in this literature, categorized by whether the test involves a 
deficit variable, a debt variable, or a Social Security wealth variable. 
This paper asks if these results can be reconciled. It suggests that a 
more complete model estimated using simultaneous-equations 
techniques can provide a partial reconciliation of these results. The 
single-equation results in the literature are misleading if interest rates 
are important in determining savings and investment 
Misinterpreting Single-Equation Results 
The Burden of the Debt 
Paradoxically, most of the current literature on testing the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem ignores interest rates, even though the 
theorem concerns the response of interest rates to changes in 
government deficits and debt. The interest rate is an important variable 
primarily because it is largely through a rise in interest rates that 
deficits are a burden on future generations. 
This paperfs main concern is with the effects of debt-financing 
versus tax-financing of a given amount of government spending; this is 
a differential-incidence analysis (in public finance terminology). If a 
government deficit causes consumption to rise, then investment must 
be crowded out (in a full employment context). This happens through 
an increase in interest rates. Consumption rises in response to a deficit 
in several cases. If consumption is a function of disposable income, 
then a tax cut that causes a higher deficit leads to higher consumption. 
If government debt is part of private net wealth and consumption is a 
function of wealth, then higher government debt implies higher wealth. 
Consumption rises. In either case, interest rates must rise. This does 
not happen if consumption is unaffected by a change in the deficit, as 
suggested by the Ricardian equivalence theorem. 
The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 
The Ricardian equivalence theorem (RET) proposes that the choice 
of financing some part of government expenditures by debt rather than 
by taxes has no effect on real economic variables such as consumption 
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and investment The theorem's main argument is that individuals ee 
their future tax liabilities as being just equal in present value to the 
debt. Thus a reduction in current axes leads persons to increase their 
savings by exactly the amount of the tax cut, enabling them to pay the 
increased taxes in the future. The RET has received its strongest and 
most rigorous treatment from Barro [1, 2, 3]. 
A simple model of saving and investment is used to illustrate how 
the Ricardian equivalence theorem works. The RET and an alternative 
Keynesian approach are nested within the same model, following the 
Feldstein-Kormendi nesting method. At equilibrium, investment plus 
the government deficit (I + DEF) must equal savings (S)ß Figure 1 
graphs investment plus the government deficit and savings versus the 
interest rate (R). Consider an initial equilibrium with income Yo, 
government spending level Go, and taxes To, where at equilibrium 
savings is So and the interest rate is Ro. What are the effects of a tax 
cut to Ti? Assume that the determinants of savings are Y, G, T, the 
deficit (DEF=G-T), the interest rate (R), and other variables. For 
simplicity, the savings function, ignoring other variables, is linearized 
as: 
(1) S = ßo + (1-ßl) (Y-ß2G-ß3T) + ß4DEF + ß5R. 
It is expected that ßi, ß2, ß3, ß4, and ßs are all nonnegative. Under 
one version of the standard Keynesian approach, the coefficients would 
beß2=0,ß3=l,andß4=0. Then: 
(2) S = ßO + (l-ßl)(Y-T) + ß5R. 
The marginal propensity to consume from disposable income is ßi, 
where 0 < ßi < 1. Thus savings depends on disposable income. A tax 
cut affects savings, but savings increase by less than the amount of the 
tax cut. Returning to equilibrium requires a rise in the interest rate, as 
shown in Figure 1. A tax cut of To - Ti would cause the savings curve 
to shift o S1 and the I + DEF curve to shift o (I + DEF)1. The interest 
rate thus rises to Ri. 
The Ricardian equivalence theorem suggests that he coefficients are 
ß2=l,ß3=0,andß4=l. Then: 
(3) S = ß0 + (l-ßl)(Y-G) + DEF + ß5R 
= ßO + (l-ßl)Y + ßlG-T + ß5R. 
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In this case, the tax cut leads savings to increase by exactly the amount 
of the tax cut (the savings curve in Figure 1 shifts to S") with no 
change in the interest rate R at equilibrium. The increase in DEF is 
offset by a rise in S. 
The Ricardian equivalence theorem also has implications for the 
treatment ofnet wealth as a variable affecting macroeconomic variables 
such as consumption and investment. The debate in the monetary 
theory literature over inside money versus outside money (more 
generally, inside assets versus outside assets) suggests that private net 
wealth is the sum of the capital stock (K), some portion of the real 
money stock <p(M/p), and some portion of the real value of government 
debt (|>(B/rp), where 0 < <p < 1 and 0 < <|> < 1. In this framework, the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem requires that <|> = 0. Government debt is 
not part of the private sectors net wealth-changes in government debt 
can not affect private saving or consumption through a wealth effect. 
Because many of the studies in the literature involve estimating 
consumption functions, equations (1), (2), and (3) must be rewritten i
terms of consumption. It is assumed throughout this analysis that 
output (Y) is exogenously given, although this is clearly an 
oversimplification/* The budget constraints of individuals imply that 
at the aggregate level: 
(4) C = Y-T-S. 
Equation (1) may be rewritten eliminating the variable DEF and writing 
everything in terms of Y, G, T, and R: 
(5) S = ß0 + (l-ßl)Y - [ß2(l-ßl)-ß4]G - [ß3(l-ßlHß4]T + ß5R. 
Consequently, 
(6) C = -ßo + ßl Y + [ß2(l-ßl)-ß4]G -[l-ß3(l-ßl)-ß4]T - ßsR. 
In terms of the polar cases described earlier, the consumption function 
in the simple Keynesian approach (ß2=0, ß3=l, ß4=0) is: 
(7) C=-ßo+ßl(Y-T)-ß5R. 
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In the case of the Ricardian equivalence theorem (ß2=l, ß3=0, ß4=l)» 
the consumption function is given by: 
(8)C = -ßO + ßl(Y-G)-ß5R. 
The Keynesian hypothesis thus implies that consumption is a function 
of disposable income, while the Ricardian hypothesis is that 
consumption depends on income minus government spending. The two 
hypotheses give the same consumption function only when the 
government's budget is balanced. 
Interpretations of Five Studies 
For purposes of illustrating the interpretations made in the 
empirical literature, five studies chosen according to the frequency with 
which they are cited in the literature are reviewed. They are Köchin 
[18], Feldstein [12], Buiter and Tobin [9], Feldstein [13], and Kormendi 
[19]. All five studies estimate consumption functions and focus on the 
coefficients of deficit, debt, or Social Security wealth variables to test 
the Ricardian equivalence theorem. The type of nesting of alternative 
hypotheses described in equations (6) to (8) is performed in two of these 
studies, Kormendi [19] and Feldstein [13]. In describing the results of 
each study, the theoretical equation to be estimated is listed first, 
followed by the estimated equation which shows the specific proxy 
variable being used. For example, the theoretical equation for the 
Köchin study is (9a), and the estimated equation is (9b). 
Consumption-function estimation in testing the RET is popular 
(as opposed to tests involving changes in interest rates or estimation of 
savings functions), probably because there is a large body of work on 
consumption-function estimation in general within the macroeconomic 
tradition. Given the model of the response of savings to changes in 
taxes under the Ricardian equivalence theorem, it is straightforward to 
see what happens to consumption. When the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem holds, a tax cut leads to an increase in savings equal in size to 
the amount of the tax cut. Consumption, therefore, is unchanged.^ 
Consequently, many studies of the Ricardian equivalence theorem 
estimate consumption functions, with taxes and government debt as 
right-side variables affecting consumption. If the coefficients on the 
debt and taxes are zero, then the RET is accepted. Nonzero coefficients 
suggest that the Ricardian equivalence theorem does not hold. 
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The first study to estimate a consumption function and test for the 
RET is Köchin [18]. He estimates a simple regression equation with 
consumption (C) as a function of disposable income (Y-T) and the 
federal deficit (G-T). He fits the equation: 
(9a) C = 5o + 6i(Y-T) + 52(G-T) +63C-1, 
(9b) APC2RA = 2.88 + 0.392 AYDRA - 0.109 AFDEFRA 
(3.44) (7.86) (2.95) 
+ 0.218 APC2RA.1, 
(2.42) 
R2 = .892, SE = 1.26, 
on aggregate annual U.S. data, 1952-1971.6 The variables are 
PC2RA = real consumption expenditures on nondurables and services; 
YDRA = real disposable income; and 
FDEFR A = the real value of the federal deficit 
Köchin interprets the negative sign on the deficit variable to mean 
that some tax discounting occurs. He does not interpret the results in 
terms of the Ricardian equivalence theorem. The results indicate that an 
increased deficit arising from a tax cut increases consumption by 28 
percent of the amount of the deficit,^ thus causing savings to rise by 
the remaining 72 percent A change in disposable income raises current 
consumption by about 40 percent of the change in income, with a long- 
run marginal propensity to consume of about 50 percent, which seems 
low compared to most estimates. 
Kochin's negative sign on the deficit variable may arise due to the 
crowding-out effect of government spending, not tax discounting. As is 
clear from equations (6) through (8), a proper test is possible only by 
including overnment spending and taxes as separate variables, not by 
using the deficit variable by itself.** 
Buiter and Tobin [9] suggest that if the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem holds, the coefficients on YDRA and FDEFRA in Kochin's 
equation (9) should be equal in magnitude and opposite in sign, as 
discussed in footnote 7. Thus Köchin provides evidence of 
nonneutrality of government deficits. Kochin's work is flawed, 
according to Buiter and Tobin, because of simultaneity in cyclical 
fluctuations of consumption, income, and the deficit. Fiscal policy 
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moves the deficit countercyclically, so there is simultaneous-equations 
bias in equation (9).^ Buiter and Tobin are critical of Kochin's proxy 
choices as well. They suggest that state and local government debt is 
important; private, not personal, disposable income should be used; 10 
the proxy variable for consumption should include the imputed value of 
durables; and everything should be in per capita terms. Furthermore, 
equation (9) contains a constant term, implying a time trend in the 
undifferenced equation, that Köchin did not include when he ran his 
regression before differencing. * * 
Buiter and Tobin replicate Kochin's experiment with a different data 
set. They then perform sensitivity tests that show that Kochin's results 
are sensitive to the sample period chosen. Adding the years 1949-1951 
and 1972-1976 to the sample period deprives the deficit of any 
explanatory power. Buiter and Tobin implement some of the 
suggestions made above on proxy choices. They find no support for 
debt neutrality, although the results are not robust due to the high 
degree of multicollinearity in all the independent variables. They 
estimate three different sets of regressions. All of the regressions are of 
consumption on national income and lagged consumption, plus fiscal 
variables. One regression includes net taxes (taxes minus transfers) and 
the government deficit, a second includes just government purchases of 
goods and services, while the third is identical to the second but 
constrains the coefficients on government purchases and national 
income to be identical. In all cases, the deficit variable and the 
government purchases variable are found to be statistically 
insignificant. 
Equation (10) shows their regression of consumption (C) on 
national income (Y) and government purchases of goods and services 
(G): 
(10a) C = So + 8iY + 82G+83C-i, 
(10b) PCERP = -156.2 + 0.352 NIRP - 0.408 GSRP 
(0.9) (4.0) (0.8) 
+ 0.682 PCERP-i, 
(6.6) 
R2 = .994, SE = 40.63, DW = 1.51. 
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The regression is run on annual data for 1949-1976 in real per capita 
terms. PCERP is personal consumption expenditures, NIRP is 
national income, and GSRP is total government purchases of goods and 
services. 
Because the coefficient on GSRP is statistically insignificant, 
Buiter and Tobin claim that the Ricardian equivalence theorem is 
rejected. They observe that there is a high degree of multicollinearity 
between NIRP and GSRP. Consequently, they run another egression 
in which government purchases are subtracted from national income to 
form a new variable (Y-G): 
(Ila) C = 6o + 5i(Y.G) + 82Ci, 
(lib) PCERP = -135.7 + 0.345 NIGSRP + 0.673 PCERP-i, 
(3.0) (5.1) (9.0) 
R2 = .994, SE = 39.8, DW = 1.50, 
where 
NIGSRP = NIRP-GSRP. 
Buiter and Tobin compare this regression to one that uses personal 
disposable income (Y-T) instead of national income as a regressor: 
(12a) C = 6o + 8i(Y-T>, 
(12b) PCERP = 123.4 + 0.875 YDRP, 
(4.5) (100.4) 
R2 = .997, SE = 27.0, DW = 1.47. 
Equations (11) and (12) resemble equations (7) and (8) above, except 
that they are missing the interest rate as an explanatory variable. Buiter 
and Tobin claim that a comparison of equations (11) and (12) supports 
Keynesian theory, because equation (12) has a lower standard error than 
does equation (1 1). It is difficult to deny the close relationship between 
consumption and disposable income. Given the differences between 
national income and personal disposable income, however, it is difficult 
to view this as evidence against the Ricardian equivalence theorem. It 
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may be preferable to examine a regression in which the tax variable 
enters separately, so that its significance may be tested. 
Kormendi [19] provides the sharpest test to date of the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem. Among various specifications that lend empirical 
support to the RET, a key result comes from an equation that includes 
wealth (W), transfer payments (TR), government debt (D), taxes (T), 
retained earnings (RE), and government et interest (GI): 
(13a) C = 80 + 81Y + 82Y.1 + 83G + S4W + 85TR + Ô6D + 87T 
+ 88RE + 89GI, 
(13b) APC1RP = INT + 0.29 ANNPRP + 0.07 ANNPRP-i 
(7.3) (3.3) 
- 0.23 AGSRP + 0.025 AWRP 
(12.8) (3.0) 
+ 0.83 ATRRP - 0.55 AGBRP 
(5.6) (2.9) 
+ 0.07 ATXRP + 0.10 ARERP 
(0.9) (0.9) 
+ 1.15 AGINTRP, 
(1.3) 
R2 = . 911, SE =.0175. 
This equation is estimated in first-difference form including an intercept 
(INT) term, on annual U.S. data for 1931-1976. The variables (all in 
real per capita terms ) are 
PC1RP = consumption on nondurables and services, including imputed 
services from durables; 
NNPRP = net national product; 
GSRP = government spending on goods and services; 
WRP = national wealth (excluding the value of government debt); 
TRRP = transfer payments; 
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GBRP = market value of all government debt; 
TXRP = total government receipts; 
RERP = retained earnings; 
GINTRP = government net interest. 
The inclusion of the war years in the sample period has a strong 
influence on the t-statistics for government spending and government 
debt. Kormendi shows, however, that the coefficients on taxes 
(TXRP), retained earnings (RERP), and government net interest 
(GINTRP) remain statistically insignificant whether the war years are 
included or not. I2 Consequently, these variables are eliminated from 
the analysis, and a new regression is run excluding the war years: 
(14a) C = 5o + 61 Y + 62 Y.i + 83G + 84W + 55TR + Ô6D, 
(14b) APC1RP = INT + 0.33 ANNPRP + 0.05 ANNPRP-i 
(14.1) (2.2) 
- 0.21 AGSRP + 0.032 AWRP+ 0.74 ATRRP 
(3.5) (3.5) (3.5) 
- 0.032 AGBRP, 
(1.6) 
R2 = .910, SE = .0178, DW = 1.6. 
This equation is estimated for the period 1931-1940/1947-1976. 
If debt neutrality holds, the coefficient on government debt (GBRP) 
should be zero, and the coefficient on government spending (GSRP) 
should be negative. The regression results in (14) thus support the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem. Kormendi claims that the results are 
robust to including the war years, using alternative estimation 
techniques, and using disposable income instead of net national product 
as an independent variable. Kormendi first-differences theestimated 
equation to correct for possible nonstationarity. 
Kormendi's results have been criticized by Modigliani and Sterling 
[23] and subjected to sensitivity tests by Barth, Iden, and Russek [7]. 
The sensitivity analysis of Barth, Iden, and Russek suggests only minor 
problems with Kormendi's specification, but Modigliani-Sterling are far 
more critical. They suggest that the long-run marginal propensity to 
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consume from equation (14) is lower than expected, about .4 instead of 
the normal range of .7 to .9. They also find fault with several of 
Kormendi's proxy choices and methods of dynamic modeling. In 
response, Kormendi and Meguire [20] suggest that Modigliani-Sterling 
do not nest the alternative hypotheses, and that their empirical results 
are questionable due to nonstationarity in their data. 
Because the Social Security system in the United States is an 
unfunded, pay-as-you-go arrangement, it has effects similar to 
government debt. Thus several studies have examined the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem by seeing if changes in the implicit debt of the 
Social Security system affect consumption spending. The first and 
most widely known of these studies is by Feldstein [12]. He develops a 
measure of the present value of future benefits that individuals expect to 
receive from the Social Security system. A consumption function is 
estimated including this measure of Social Security wealth (SSW) as a 
regressor, along with wealth (W) and retained earnings (RE). On U.S. 
annual data in real per capita terms for 1929-1940/1947-1971, the result 
is: 
(15a) C = 8o + 6i(Y-T) + Ô2(Y-T)-i + 53RE + 84W + 65SSW, 
(15b) PCERP = 228 + 0.530 YDRP + 0.120 YDRP.i 
(7.4) (11.3) (3.4) 
+ 0.356 RERP + 0.014 WRP 
(4.8) (3.5) 




PCERP = personal consumption expenditure; 
YDRP = personal disposable income; 
RERP = retained earnings; 
WRP = the market value of household net worth; and 
SSWRP = a gross measure of Social Security wealth. 
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The significant coefficient on the Social Security wealth variable 
suggests that the Ricardian equivalence theorem does not hold for the 
government's Social Security debt. Surprisingly, the coefficient on 
Social Security wealth exceeds that on wealth. This may be because 
the wealth measure used by Feldstein includes the value of government 
debt. The results also indicate that savings would be 50 percent higher 
in 1971 if the Social Security system did not exist. 
Feldstein's results have been criticized severely. Most importantly, 
Leimer and Lesnoy [22] find that a computational error in Feldstein's 
creation of the Social Security wealth variable is important to the 
results. When the error (which Feldstein acknowledged) is corrected, 
Social Security wealth becomes insignificant in the consumption 
regression. Leimer and Lesnoy also find that Feldstein's results are 
sensitive to the sample period chosen. Further, they question some of 
the assumptions that go into the creation of the Social Security wealth 
variable, because such a variable requires an explicit formulation fhow 
persons form expectations about future benefits under the system. 
Feldstein [14] suggests that the sensitivity of the results to the 
sampling period is due to the significant change in benefits that went 
into effect in 1972. He reruns his original regression for a sample 
ending in 1971 (including the corrected variable for Social Security 
wealth) and finds support for his original results (although the 
magnitude of the impact on saving is not the same). 
Feldstein's [12] result rejected the Ricardian equivalence theorem. 
If the RET holds, Social Security wealth should have no effect on 
consumption because it is a pure debt. The regression in Feldstein, 
however, does not deal with other forms of government debt and is thus 
not a strong test of the RET. More recently, Feldstein [13] attempts a 
more explicit test of the Ricardian equivalence theorem. He adds 
government spending (G), tax (T), transfer (TR), and debt (D) variables 
to the consumption equation with the following results: 
(16a) C = 8o + 6i(Y-T) + Ô2(Y-T)-i + 83 W + 84SSW + 85G + 8öT 
+ 87TR + 88D, 
(16b) PCERP = -0.413 + 0.582 YDRP + 0.053 YDRP-i 
(0.5) (2.9) (0.4) 
+ 0.102 WRP + 0.064 SSWRP 
(1.0) (0.8) 
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+ 0.927 GSRP - 1.734 TXRP 
(0.8) (0.8) 
+ 1.256 TRRP + 0.175 GBRP, 
(1.0) (1.0) 
SE = .0713, DW = 1.76, 
where 
PCERP = personal consumption expenditure; 
YDRP = personal disposable income; 
WRP = the market value of private net wealth (including overnment 
debt); 
SSWRP = Social Security wealth; 
GSRP =s government purchases of goods and services; 
TXRP = total government receipts; 
TRRP = government transfers toindividuals; and 
GBRP = government debt 
The equation is estimated on annual U.S. data for 1930-1940/1947- 
1977, with all variables in real per capita terms. Because Feldstein 
feels that there are simultaneity problems with the tax variable (TXRP), 
he uses TXRP-i as an instrumental variable for TXRP. Because of the 
apparent problem of multicollinearity, Feldstein drops the government 
debt (GBRP) variable and reruns the equation: 
(17) PCERP = 0.207 + 0.738 YDRP + 0.060 YDRP.i 
(2.2) (9.5) (1.3) 
+ 0.009 WRP + 0.014 SSWRP 
(1.3) (1.0) 
- 0.027 GSRP - 0.047 TXRP 
(0.2) (0.2) 
+ 0.135 TRRP, 
(1.5) 
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SE = .0218, DW = 1.64 
Feldstein claims that this equation provides trong evidence against 
the Ricardian equivalence theorem. The coefficients on government 
spending (GSRP) and taxes (TXRP) are small and statistically 
insignificant, while the coefficients on transfers (TRRP) and Social 
Security wealth (SSWRP) are positive. 
Feldstein's willingness to cite this regression as evidence against 
the Ricardian equivalence theorem seems odd. The statistical 
insignificance of every variable except disposable income (YDRP) is 
indicative of serious multicollinearity, which Feldstein recognized in 
the earlier equation. He also thinks that the positive coefficients found 
for Social Security wealth (SSWRP) and transfers (TRRP) are 
important, despite their lack of statistical significance. 
Interpretations in Terms of 
Simultaneous Equations 
Economic theory suggests that government debt is a burden on 
future generations only if it raises interest rates. The five studies under 
examination fail to deal with interest rates in their tests of the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem. This section examines whether interest rates are 
important determinants ofsavings and investment and how the interest 
rate adjusts to clear the market for funds. The interpretations of the 
coefficients inthe model differ from those of a single-equation system. 
A simple investment function is posited: 
(18) ^ao + cciY-ocsR. 
ai and as are expected to be nonnegative. This simple investment 
function is designed to match economic theory; investment falls when 
the interest rate rises, but rises with output. Market clearing in the 
market for funds now requires: 
(19) S = I + DEF. 
The interest rate adjusts to clear the market. The reduced form for the 
interest rate is: 
(20) R = {(ao-ßo) - (l-ai-ßi)Y + [l+(l-ßl)ß2-ß4]G + 
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Kl-ßl)ß3+P4-l]T}/(a5+ß5). 
Under the standard Keynesian approach, with ß2=0, ß3=l, ß4=0, the 
interest rate is: 
(21) R = {(ao-ßo) - (l-ai-ßl)Y + G - ßiT}/(a5+ß5) 
Under the Ricardian equivalence theorem, the interest rate is (where 
ß2=l,ß3=0,andß4=l): 
(22) R = {(cxo-ßo) - (l-cti-ßi)Y + (l-ßi)G}/(a5+ß5). 
In the case of a tax cut, the rise in the interest rate is given by 
-dR/dT = ßi/(cc5+ß5) > Ofor the standard Keynesian approach, and 
-dR/dT = 0 under the Ricardian equivalence theorem. Note, however, 
that there is no difference between the two approaches in the case of a 
balanced budget increase in government spending (dG=dT), when dR/dT 
= (l-ßl)/(ct5+ß5). 
The reduced form for the interest rate is used to find the reduced 
form for consumption: 
(23) C = {-(aoß5+«5ßo) + [(l-<xi)ß5 + <*5ßi]Y + [«5[(l-ßl)ß2 - ß4l 
ß5lG - a5[l-(l-ßl)ß3 -ß4]T}/(oc5+ß5). 
Under the Standard Keynesian approach, this is: 
(24) C = {-(<X0ß5+<X5ß0) + Kl-otl)ß5 + «5ßi]Y- ß5G 
- (X5ßlT}/((X5+ß5), 
while under the Ricardian equivalence theorem it is: 
(25) C = Kaoß5+oc5ßo) + Kl-ai)ß5 + a5ßl]Y- 
(a5ßl+ß5)G}/(a5+ß5). 
Now the coefficients on G and T under the two approaches, abbreviated 
as SKA and RET, for both the nonreduced form given by equation (6) 
and the reduced form of equation (23) are examined. 
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Coefficients on: Nonreduced form (6) Reduced form (23) 
G (SKA) 0 -ß5/(<X5+ß5)<0 
G (RET) -ßi < 0 -(<X5ßl+ß5)/(<X5+ß5) < 0 
T (SKA) -ßi < 0 -cx5ßl/(a5+ß5) < 0 
T (RET) 0 0 
The only coefficient that remains unchanged in going from the 
nonreduced form to the reduced form is the coefficient on T under the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem, which remains at zero in both equations. 
Given these results, the interpretations (that assume that a 
structural equation has been estimated) made by the authors of the five 
studies in question are valid only if the coefficient (ßs) on the interest 
rate variable in the consumption function is zero.1 3 Their results 
depend on the absence of an interest rate effect on savings. On the other 
hand, if ßs is nonzero, then what they have estimated is a reduced form 
for consumption such as equation (23) with quite different implications. 
Equation (24) has empirical implications for those who believe in 
the standard Keynesian approach. Buiter and Tobin, for example, 
regress consumption on disposable income, arguing that this equation 
is consistent with Keynesian theory and is empirically superior to other 
equations for consumption. As equation (24) shows, this assertion is 
false if interest rates affect consumption (ßs * 0). Government 
spending ought to be an included variable and the coefficients on 
income and taxes ought to be different because the equation is a reduced- 
form equation, not a structural equation. 
Replications, Sensitivity Testing, and 
Simultaneous-Equations Estimation 
Given these theoretical results for the simultaneous-equations 
system, how would the empirical results of the five studies mentioned 
above be affected? As none of the studies includes an interest rate 
variable, their esults cannot be compared irectly. Therefore, this paper 
attempts to replicate each study using a master data set for 1929-1976. 
Next each is tested for sensitivity to the sample period chosen. Then 
the interest rate is included as a variable in the consumption function to 
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see if it seems to be an important omitted variable.^ Finally, the 
consumption function and an investment function are estimated 
simultaneously. Tables 2 through 8 show the results. 
Köchin 
Replications of Kochin's results are shown in Table 2. The table 
shows five results: (1) the first column (ORIG) shows Kochin's 
original results; (2) the REPL column attempts to replicate Kochin's 
results; (3) the 47-83 column extends the time period from 1952-1971 
to 1947-1983; (4) the TB3R column adds the interest rate variable 
TB3R to the equation; and (5) the 2SLS column estimates the 
consumption function simultaneously with an investment function in 
which the interest rate is treated as endogenous. 
The replication is similar to Kochin's original regression. When 
the sample period is extended to 1947-1983, however, the results 
change significantly. The federal deficit variable becomes statistically 
insignificant. The Durbin- Watson statistic for the regression shows 
problems with the regression. But these problems disappear with the 
introduction of the interest rate variable (TB3R) into the regression. 
This suggests that the Durbin- Watson statistic in the earlier regression 
was signaling the presence of an omitted variable, not autocorrelation. 
The two equation approach (2SLS) confirms this result The federal 
deficit lacks significance in the regression. 
Buiter and Tobin 
Tables 3 and 4 show replications of the Buiter and Tobin results. 
Table 3 shows that it is difficult o resist the notion that personal 
consumption is related closely to disposable personal income. 
Replication results are similar to the original. The addition of the 
interest rate as a regressor does not seem to add anything. The 
replication using national income minus government purchases 
(NIGSRP) shown in Table 4 is fairly close to the original. But now 
the interest rate variable plays a significant role in the single equation, 
although it is somewhat weaker in the simultaneous system. 
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Kormendi 
Kormendi's results are replicated in Table 5. The data set differs 
from Kormendi's original data set only in the wealth variable. 
Kormendi runs the regressions in first differences in response to 
perceived nonstationarity of the variables in levels. Table S shows that 
the replication is similar to the original study but significantly different 
for some variables, due solely to the alternate wealth proxy choice. 
Variation in the sample period (see the column for the 1947-1976 
regression) primarily affects the coefficients on government purchases 
and government debt Adding the interest rate to the regression, either 
using ordinary least squares or the simultaneous-equations approach, has 
little impact. 
There may be a small problem with these regressions as a result of 
the construction of the dependent variable PC1RP. Kormendi attempts 
to construct a variable that incorporates consumption of durables. The 
consumption variable (PC1RP) thus adds consumption of nondurables 
(CNDRP), consumption of services (CSRP), and 0.3 x the stock of 
durable consumer goods (DURRP). It may be that the arbitrary fixed 
coefficient of 0.3 on the durable stock induces autocorrelation i the 
PC1RP regressions, especially because the regressions of Feldstein 
using personal consumption expenditures (PCERP) regressed on many 
of the same right side variables, do not exhibit autocorrelation i the 
residuals. 
Kormendi's proxy variable for wealth excludes the value of 
government debt, so the test of the Ricardian equivalence theorem is 
whether the coefficient on the government debt variable (GBRP) is zero. 
The proxy variable for wealth used in the replications is that of 
Feldstein [13], which includes the value of government debt. Under the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem, the coefficient of GBRP ought to be 
negative and equal in magnitude to the coefficient on the wealth 
variable. Under the standard Keynesian approach the coefficient on 
GBRP ought to be zero. The imprecision of the estimates, as 
witnessed by the low t-statistics on WRP and GBRP, prevents a robust 
conclusion. It should be noted, however, that the coefficients on these 
variables are fairly stable across the alternative specifications given in 
Table 5. 
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Feldstein [12] 
Table 6 shows the replication of Feldstein's results. The first wo 
columns show that the results are replicated fairly closely, but 
regressions over the sample period 1947-1971 and 1947-1976 show 
dramatic differences in the results. The coefficients on the wealth 
variable (WRP) and Social Security wealth variable (SSWRP) are 
sensitive to the sample period and are highly unstable across the 
alternative specifications given in Table 6. Adding the interest rate 
variable (TB3R) yields interesting results. In the ordinary least squares 
regression adding the interest rate variable has some impact on the 
wealth variable, which does not seem surprising. 
When the simultaneous-equations estimate is run, however, the 
regression falls apart. The standard error increases nearly tenfold. The 
major reason for this result is telling: in the second-stage of the two 
stage least squares procedure, the interest rate variable is the most 
important variable in the regression. It is estimated imprecisely in the 
first stage, however, so the estimated values of consumption differ 
significantly from the actual values. This suggests that the interest rate 
is an important determinant of consumption, but that there may be 
changes needed in the structural equations (omitted variables or 
functional form). 
Feldstein [13] 
Table 7 shows the replication of Feldstein's results, including 
government debt (GBRP) as an explanatory variable. Replication of the 
original regression does not work well when the government debt 
(GBRP) variable is included, but comes close for most variables when 
GBRP is excluded. This suggests that the proxy variable for 
government debt used by Feldstein is significantly different from the 
one used in this study. To compare the results with Feldstein's 
instrumental variables estimation, but also to allow the simultaneous- 
equations estimation later, the estimation is done using two stage least 
squares. Lagged government revenue (TXRPL) is used as an instrument 
for current TXRP. 
Adding the interest rate variable (TB3R) to the single equation 
estimation causes little change. The two equation estimation looks 
quite different, however. The government revenue (TXRP) coefficient 
is positive and close to the coefficient on disposable income (YDRP), 
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lending some support to the Ricardian equivalence theorem. ^ Transfer 
payments and Social Security wealth are insignificant, while 
government purchases crowd out consumption. Because the wealth 
variable includes the value of government debt, the RET suggests that 
the coefficient on government debt (GBRP) ought to be negative and of 
equal magnitude to the coefficient on wealth (WRP). As the 
government debt variable is positive and marginally significant, there is 
some evidence against the RET. 
Investment Equations 
Table 8 shows the estimated investment equations for the two-stage 
least squares estimations. The structural equation for investment is a 
simple one: 
(26) GIt = ao + cqNNPt + (X2GIt-l - (X3TB3R, 
where 
GI = gross investment. 
oci, CC2, and (X3 are expected to be nonnegative. The estimation does 
not work well when used with the consumption equations of Köchin 
and Buiter and Tobin. In both cases, low Durbin- Watson statistics are 
indicative of some problems in the regression structure. Gross 
investment, however, is estimated well for the Feldstein [12] and 
Feldstein [13] equations. The interest rate has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient, and the other signs are as expected. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper attempts to show that existing single equation 
estimation of consumption functions may be inadequate for testing the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem. In a simple macroeconomic framework, 
it is demonstrated that interpreting estimated consumption functions as 
structural equations may be misleading if interest rates, consumption, 
and investment are determined simultaneously. To show the 
importance of this result empirically, five studies are replicated and 
reestimated using a two-equation system. 
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The reestimation of Kochin's results shows the importance of the 
interest rate as a variable in the consumption function. The 
consumption equation is seriously misspecified, however, because it is 
in aggregate rather than per capita terms and because it includes only the 
federal deficit rather than the total government deficit as a regressor. 
Buiter and Tobin demonstrate the close relationship between 
disposable personal income and personal consumption expenditures. 
But their regression alone is an inadequate test of the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem, and there is some evidence of omitted variables 
(such as the interest rate and other variables included by Feldstein [12] 
and Feldstein [13].) 
Feldstein tests the effects on consumption of Social Security 
wealth. His finding of a significant relationship is not confirmed by 
the replications, which show great sensitivity to the sample period 
chosen. The interest rate seems to be an important explanatory variable 
for consumption. 
The sharpest tests of the Ricardian equivalence theorem come from 
using the method of nesting alternative hypotheses as is done by 
Kormendi and Feldstein. Kormendi finds support for the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem, and his results hold up well to sensitivity 
analysis. The results are somewhat sensitive to differences inthe proxy 
variables used as well as the sample period. 
The presence of multicollinearity clouds the results of Feldstein. 
Feldstein finds evidence against the RET, but reestimating his equations 
does not support that position fully. The two equation estimate 
including the interest rate as a regressor yields different results from the 
single equation estimation that omits the interest rate variable. 
The estimated investment equations work well. The coefficient on 
the interest rate is significant and negative in many of the regressions. 
Although this paper devotes little effort o the specification of this 
equation, it is important in the estimation of consumption. In a 
simultaneous-equations estimation, structural misspecification i  one 
equation may affect the other equation adversely. There is some 
evidence of this in the Köchin and Buiter and Tobin reestimations. 
Overall, the evidence on the Ricardian equivalence theorem is 
mixed. The Feldstein-Kormendi nesting approach offers the greatest 
test of the hypothesis, but the results are unclear. The evidence 
suggests trongly that the interest rate is an important variable affecting 
consumption, and that the two equation approach holds promise. 
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There are other aspects to testing the Ricardian equivalence theorem 
that have been ignored in this paper. Many variables that have been 
treated as exogenous are not; a model that specifies a complete 
macroeconomic structure may be needed for an adequate test of the RET. 
In particular, modeling reaction functions for monetary and fiscal policy 
may be necessary. The Lucas critique applies here if policy regimes 
have changed significantly over time. This would explain the sample 
period sensitivity of the results. The distinction between a Ricardian 
regime in which current debt is repaid by future taxes and a non- 
Ricardian regime in which debt is rolled over forever is crucial. 
Further, more work on business cycle effects and proxy choices seems 
warranted. 
The key question is whether the interest rate belongs in the 
consumption function. Macroeconomic theory strongly suggests that it 
does. Gylfason [16] provides some empirical evidence showing the 
importance of the interest rate for consumption. This paper 
demonstrates not only that the interest rate is important, but also that a 
proper investigation of the effect of government debt on consumption 
and interest rates requires a simultaneous-equations approach. 
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Endnotes 
♦Thanks to M. Kevin McGee and referees for useful comments and 
suggestions on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Philip Meguire and 
Roger C. Kormendi for access to their original data and helpful 
discussion of preliminary replications of Kormendi's work. 
1. This is true in a closed economy. In an open economy, of 
course, borrowing from abroad may lead to a burden on future 
generations if higher taxes are imposed in the future to repay the foreign 
debt 
2. The fragile nature of empirical results concerning the effects of 
government budget deficits on interest rates is demonstrated by Barth, 
Iden, and Russek [5]. For other criticisms of this literature, see 
Bernheim [8]. 
3. In the GNP accounting framework, ignoring the foreign sector, 
this comes from the goods market clearing condition C+I+G=C+S+T, 
which can be rewritten as I+DEF=S where DEF=G-T. 
4. Although changes in the interest rate may have no 
contemporaneous effect on output, they must have some future ffect if 
the government debt is to have any burden on future generations. 
5. As consumption (C) equals Y-T-S, consumption is unaffected 
because the fall in T is exactly offset by a rise in S. 
6. In every empirical equation in this paper, the numbers in 
parentheses beneath estimated coefficients are the absolute values of t- 
statistics, DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, and SE is the standard 
error of estimate. Time subscripts are omitted, with a subscript of "-1" 
meaning the value of the variable at time t-1. Unless specified 
otherwise, statistical tests are performed at the 5 percent level. 
7. This result is clear from looking at the equation: C = <x(Y- 
T)+ß(G-T) = aY - (a+ß)T + ßG. Thus the immediate impact of a tax 
change is found by adding the coefficients on disposable income and the 
deficit. Notice, however, that this form of estimation is unnecessarily 
restrictive, as it imposes an implicit constraint on the coefficients on 
Y, T, and G. 
8. This point also is discussed by Barth, Iden, and Russek [5]. 
9. This also may be why Köchin found a low Durbin-Watson 
value in his nondifferenced equation. It seems likely that the problem 
is specification error, not autocorrelation. 
107 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
10. Private disposable income includes retained earnings of the 
corporate sector, but personal disposable income does not 
11. The (implicit) time trend in equation (9) which is missing 
from Kochin's nondifferenced specification probably explains the 
significantly different coefficient estimates between the differenced and 
nondifferenced versions. This is not surprising with a time series 
dataset in which all variables are growing. 
12. SeeKormendi[19],Tables4and5. Feldstein and Elmendorf 
[15] refute this, however, arguing that the war years have a big impact 
on àie estimated regression. 
13. Equation (23) is identical to equation (6) when ßs=O. 
14. The OLS regressions that include the interest rate as a variable 
eliminate the omitted variables bias, but contain simultaneous- 
equations bias. This intermediate step shows the importance of each of 
these biases. 
15. As Feldstein uses as regressors Y-T and T, the coefficient on 
Y-T must be subtracted from the coefficient on T to find the overall 
coefficient on T. Thus if the coefficients on Y-T and T are close 
together, the implicit coefficient showing the total effect of T on C is 
close to zero, as suggested by the Ricardian equivalence theorem. 
16. Kormendi's original wealth variable excludes the value of 
government debt, while the data used in the replication include the value 
of government debt 
17. Feldstein reports his sample period as running through 1977, 
but the data he reports run only through 1976. Thus the replication and 
simultaneous-equation estimation only go to 1976. 
18. For Köchin, the estimated investment function is GIRA as a 
function of NNPRA, GIRAL, and TB3R. For all others, GIRP is a 
function of NNPRP, GIRPL, and TB3R. 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
References 
1. Barro, Robert J., "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?" 
Journal of Political Economy, 82 (Nov. /Dec. 1974), pp. 1095-1117. 
2.  , "Reply to Feldstein and Buchanan," Journal of 
Political Economy, 84 (April 1976), pp. 343-349. 
3.  , "Public Debt and Taxes," in Michael J. Boskin (ed.) 
Federal Tax Reform (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary 
Studies, 1978a). 
4.  , The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving 
(Washington, D. C: American Enterprise Institute, 1978b). 
5. Barth, James, R., George Iden, and Frank S. Russek, "Do 
Federal Deficits Really Matter?" Contemporary Policy Issues, 3 (Fall 
1984-1985), pp. 79-95. 
6.  , , and  , "Federal Borrowing and Short-Term 
Interest Rates: Comment," Southern Economic Journal, 52 (October 
1985), pp. 554-559. 
7.  ,  , and  , "Government Debt, Government 
Spending, and Private Sector Behavior: Some Additional Results," 
American Economic Review, 76 (December 1986), pp. 1158-1167. 
8. Bernheim, B. Douglas, "Ricardian Equivalence: An 
Evaluation of Theory and Evidence," NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
1987 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 263-304. 
9. Buiter, Willem H. and Tobin, James, "Debt Neutrality: A 
Brief Review of Doctrine and Evidence," in George M. von 
Furstenberg (ed.) Social Security vs. Private Saving (Cambridge: 
Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 39-63. 
10. Darby, Michael R., The Effects of Social Security on Income 
and the Capital Stock (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1979). 
1 1 . Evans, Paul, "Do Large Deficits Produce High Interest Rates?" 
American Economic Review, 75 (March 1985), pp. 68-87. 
12. Feldstein, Martin, "Social Security, Induced Retirement, and 
Aggregate Capital Accumulation," Journal of Political Economy, 82 
(Sept/Oct. 1974), pp. 905-926. 
109 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
13.  , "Government Deficits and Aggregate Demand," 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 9 (January 1982a), pp. 1-20. 
14.  , "Social Security and Private Saving: Reply," Journal 
of Political Economy, 90 (June 1982b), pp. 630-642. 
IS. Feldstein, Martin and Douglas W. Elmendorf, "Taxes, Budget 
Deficits and Consumer Spending: Some New Evidence," National 
Bureau of Economic Research, working paper no. 2355 (August 1987). 
16. Gylfason, Thorvaldur, "Interest Rates, Inflation, and the 
Aggregate Consumption Function," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 63 (May 1981), pp. 233-245. 
17. Holcombe, Randall G., John D. Jackson, and Ashgar 
Zardkoohi, "The National Debt Controversy," Kyklos, 34 (1981), pp. 
186-202. 
18. Kochin, Levis A., "Are Future Taxes Anticipated by 
Consumers?" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 6 (August 1974), 
pp. 385-394. 
19. Kormendi, Roger C, "Government Debt, Government 
Spending, and Private Sector Behavior," American Economic Review, 
73 (December 1983), pp. 994-1010. 
20. Kormendi, Roger C. and Philip Meguire, "Government Debt, 
Government Spending, and Private Sector Behavior: Reply," American 
Economic Review, 76 (December 1986), pp. 1180-1187. 
21. Koskela, Erkki and Matti Viren, "Social Security and 
Household Saving in an International Cross Section, " American 
Economic Review, 73 (March 1983), pp. 212-217. 
22. Leimer, Dean R. and Selig D. Lesnoy, "Social Security and 
Private Saving: New Time Series Evidence," Journal of Political 
Economy, 90 (June 1982), pp. 606-629. 
23. Modigliani, Franco and Arlie Sterling, "Government Debt, 
Government Spending, and Private Sector Behavior: A Comment," 
American Economic Review, 76 (December 1986), pp. 1168-1179. 
24. Munnell, Alicia H., "The Impact of Social Security on 
Personal Savings," National Tax Journal, 27 (December 1974a), pp. 
553-567. 
110 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
25.  , The Effects of Social Security on Personal Saving 
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1974b). 
26. Reid, Bradford G., "Aggregate Consumption and Deficit 
Financing: An Attempt to Separate Permanent from Transitory 
Effects," Economic Inquiry, 23 (July 1985), pp. 475-486. 
27. Seater, John J., "The Market Value of Outstanding 
Government Debt, 1919-1975," Journal of Monetary Economics, 8 
(July 1981), pp. 85-101. 
28. Seater, John J. and Robert S. Mariano, "New Tests of the Life 
Cycle and Tax Discounting Hypothesis," Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 15 (March 1985), pp. 195-215. 
29. Tanner, J. Ernest, "Empirical Evidence on the Short-Run Real 
Balance Effect in Canada," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2 
(November 1970), pp. 473-485. 
30.  , "An Empirical Investigation of Tax Discounting," 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 11 (May 1979), pp. 214-218. 
31. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, The National Income and Product Accounts of the United 
States, 1929-1976 Statistical Tables (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1981). 
32.  , Survey of Current Business, various issues (see data 
appendix). 
33.  , Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the U.S., 
1925-1979 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1982). 
34.  , Business Statistics, various issues (see data appendix). 
35. Yawitz, Jess B. and Laurence H. Meyer, "An Empirical 
Investigation of the Extent of Tax Discounting," Journal of Money, 
Créât and Banking, 8 (May 1976), pp. 247-254. 
Ill 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
S Ö 










I x xx Q 
m X 
I ¡§ * ^ i 
co 
« „ r 21 a a jjj 
EilIt^slBlll 
 Ö «h 
112 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
s s 
Ili IS G Ö H CO S 










"I X X §" 
g g I î 
lilillll 
ci en Tf in v¿ S oo a 
113 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CO 0L4 
"S o ^ SS « ^  •§ 
H1g ss« 
'o o' m 
vo r^ m 
g^ öS Ss? Sp Ss ?ì^ s ¿ ¿¿ o¿ 9¿ doo m ¿, ^ 
<£ <N 
+ 00 <S 00 
T w 9°o ^^ ovo inoo go 
^ r^ ¿Ó ^Ó ^S ^S ¡ 5j 
+ 
O 
J^ Ox Tf CN 
+ B¡ ÍP: S,f? S,(? Sf? £ 




^ co ^t co 
g ^Ö ÖÖ 90 0¿ i $ 
H S P È * - 1 S ç û u « Ö ^ fe Oh t~^ Ph 
114 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1 g 
2.1 
os r^ »n Os co ^ c4 es 
Os 
ON CS vo os o en 
ci ci 
+ o' on es 
»"71 on «n o 
U ^ -*' en co 
+ 
cS1 ^° ON ON VO 00 
+ Os 00 eS 
O 
' es *-h I 
CO 
+ 
f II - On m 00 
rj os es vq es ö 
es W N 
115 
This content downloaded from 141.166.38.17 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 13:55:03 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Table 3 
Buiter-Tobin - Regression 1 
Dependent Variable PCERP 
C = 5o + 8i(Y-T) + Ô2R 
ORIG REPL TB3R 2SLS 
INT 123.4 161.3 161.3 161.4 
(4.5) (6.3) (6.4) (6.1) 
YDRP 0.875 0.856 0.855 0.854 
(100.4) (105.5) (107.1) (99.6) 
TB3R - - 4.27 9.76 
(1.4) (1.2) 
Period 49-76 49-76 49-76 49-76 
R2 .997 .998 .998 .997 
S.E. 27.0 25.5 25.1 26.7 
D.W. 1.47 1.67 1.71 1.62 
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Table 4 
Buiter-Tobin - Regression 2 
Dependent Variable PCERP 
C = ôo + 5i(Y-G) + 52C.1 + 53R 
ORIG REPL TB3R 2SLS 
INT -135.7 -67.0 -66.6 -64.4 
(3.0) (1.7) (1.7) (0.9) 
NIGSRP 0.345 0.404 0.358 0.155 
(5.1) (5.3) (4.6) (0.7) 
PCERPL 0.673 0.645 0.689 0.883 
(9.0) (8.5) (9.0) (4.3) 
TB3R - - 8.52 45.9 
(1.9) (1.6) 
Period 49-76 49-76 49-76 49-76 
R2 .994 .995 .995 .983 
S.E. 39.8 37.1 35.4 69.2 
D.W. 1.50 1.69 1.75 1.15 
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Table 7 
Feldstein - Including GBRP 
Dependent Variable PCERP 
C = 80 + Ôi(Y-T) + Ô2(Y-T).i + 83W + 84SSW + 85G + 8öT 
+ 87TR + 88D + 89R 
ORIG REPL TB3R 2SLS 
INT -0.413 65.6 -31.4 460.6 
(0.5) (0.4) (0.1) (3.2) 
YDRP 0.582 0.686 0.667 0.689 
(2.9) (8.2) (6.8) (8.4) 
YDRPL 0.053 0.0339 0.0635 -0.0317 
(0.4) (0.6) (0.8) (0.5) 
WRP 0.102 0.0323 0.435 -0.00921 
(1.0) (2.2) (1.5) (0.5) 
SSWRP 0.064 0.0171 0.0223 -0.0115 
(0.8) (1.1) (0.9) (1.0) 
GSRP 0.927 0.118 0.197 -0.224 
(0.8) (0.8) (0.8) (1.9) 
TXRP -1.734 -0.337 -0.522 0.530 
(0.8) (1.0) (0.9) (2.2) 
TRRP 1.256 0.516 0.592 0.115 
(1.0) (2.2) (1.7) (0.6) 
GBRP 0.175 0.0614 0.0665 0.0248 
(1.0) (2.6) (2.0) (1.6) 
TB3R - - -2.316 5.49 
(0.7) (1.5) 
Period 17 30-40/47-77 30-40/47-76 30-40/47-76 30-40/47-76 
R2 - .998 .998 .999 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Feldstein - Including GBRP 
Dependent Variable PCERP 
C = 00 + §i(Y-T) + 52(Y-T).i + 63W + 84SSW + 55G + Ô6T 
+ 87TR + §8D + 89R 
ORIG REPL TB3R 2SLS 
S.E. 0.0713 28.8 34.7 26.0 
D.W. 1.76 1.69 1.65 1.64 
Method IV 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Single Single Simultaneous 
Equation Equation Equation 
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Figure 1 
The Deficit and the Interest Rate 
The rise in the deficit from DEF to DEF (due to a tax cut) 
leads to a rise in savings to S' thus causing the interest rate to rise 
from Ro to Ri, according to the standard Keynesian approach. If the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem holds, however, savings increases from S
to S", and the interest rate is unchanged. 
R ss1 
N. / / s" 
/ / /^' N + DEF1 
/ N+DEF 
So Si S2 I + DEF, S 
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Data Appendix 
1 . Data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIP A) 
All variables the last two letters of which are RA (e.g., CNDRA) 
are in real aggregate terms. Real means 1972 dollars. Variables ending 
in NA (e.g., RENA) are in nominal aggregate terms (billions of 
dollars). Nominal variables are divided by PCEPD to form real 
variables. Aggregate variables are divided by POP to form per capita 
variables, which end in P (e.g., RERA = RENA/PCEPD; RERP = 
RERA/POP). Lagged variables end in L (e.g., PC2RAL = PC2RA at 
time t-1). Unless otherwise noted, the variables come from: 
1929-1975 - National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States, 1929-1976 (with corrections in 
SCB July 1982). 
1976-1978 - Survey of Current Business (SCB) July 1982. 
1979 - SCB July 1983 
1980-1983 - SCB July 1984 
1983 - SCB October 1985 
For each variable below, the NIPA table number is given. 
Consumption variables: 
CNDRA = Personal consumption expenditures on nondurable 
goods, Table 1.2. 
CSRA = Personal consumption expenditures on services, Table 
1.2. 
PCERA = Personal consumption expenditures, total, Table 1.2. 
[PCERA = CNDRA + CSRA + CDRA (durable 
purchases)] 
PCEPD = Personal consumption expenditures implicit price 
deflator, Table 7.1. 
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Income variables: 
NIRA = National income, Table 1.8. 
NNPR A = Net national product, Table 1 .8. 
RENA = Retained earnings (undistributed corporate profits with 
inventory valuation and capital consumption 
adjustments), Table 1.11. 
YDRA = Disposable personal income, Table 2. 1 . 
Government variables: 
FDEFNA = Federal government deficit, Table 3.2. 
GSRA = Government purchases of goods and services, Tables 
1.2, 3.8B. 
TRNA = Total government transfer payments to persons, Table 
3.1. 
TXNA = Total government receipts, Table 3.1. 
Other variables: 
DURRA = Total net stock of durable goods owned by 
consumers; 1929-1977 from Fixed Reproducible 
Tangible Wealth in the U. 5., 1925-1979, Table 
A16; 1978-1979 SCB October 1982, 1980 SCB Aug. 
1983, 1981-1983 SCB Aug. 1984, Table 19. 
GINA = Gross investment, Table 5.1. 
POP = Population. 1929-1983 SCB July 1984, Table 8.2. 
TB3 = 3 month Treasury bill interest rate (auction average), 
1929-1938 Business Statistics (BS) 1955, p. 82; 
1939-1946 BS 1965, p. 91; 1947-1960 BS 1975, p. 
92; 1961-1983 BS 1984, p. 65. 
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2. Data from non-NIPA sources 
GBNA = Market value of government debt held by the public, 
from Seater (1981) - MVTOTG1, Table 1, 1929- 
1976. 
SSWRA = Social Security wealth, from Feldstein [13], 1930- 
1976. 
WRA = Private fungible wealth, market value, including the 
value of government debt held by the public, from 
Feldstein (1982a), 1930-1976. 
3. Created variables 
NIGSRP = NIRP - GSRP. 
PC1RA = CNDRA + CSRA + 0.3*DURRA 
PC2RA = CNDRA + CSRA 
DMFLAT = inflation rate calculated using PCEPD. 
TB3R = TB3 - INFLAT. 
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